Articles Posted in Hearing Officer Eugenia M. Guastaferri

Overview: In Radwin v. Mass General Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint from a nurse researcher alleging that she was discharged from her position in retaliation for raising the issue that certain events and meetings were scheduled on or around Jewish holidays. The Complainant suggested that she was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment because of her religion.

In deciding to dismiss the complaint, the hearing officer determined that the Complainant failed to establish a causal connection between the protected activity—calling attention to events being scheduled on Jewish holidays—and her termination. Credible evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating the Complainant, namely, that she was “tense, high strung and impatient with those she did not perceive as her intellectual equals” and “repeatedly engaged in conduct that reflected a lack of sensitivity toward support staff.” There was no evidence that scheduling events on or near Jewish holidays was anything but an oversight or at worst insensitivity on the part of the schedulers.

Before proceeding to trial, an employment discrimination case in court must survive a hurdle in the procedural process known as summary judgment, which is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56 and Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure (MRCP) 56. As discussed here, the process is different when an employment discrimination case remains under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Under federal law, three Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1986, referred to as The Trilogy, examined the summary judgment standard. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court characterized the summary judgment inquiry as “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” In doing so, the Supreme Court delineated the province of the jury: