Articles Posted in MCAD Digest

Overview: In Carta v. Wingate Healthcare, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant, a 69-year-old and qualified handicapped individual who was terminated from her health care position. The MCAD awarded emotional distress damages and ordered the Respondent to conduct training of certain human resources employees after the Complainant was injured during the course of her employment and was subsequently terminated. After her injury, the Complainant returned to work on a part-time basis but was ultimately fired because she could not return to full-time work.

Finding the essential issue to be whether further extending the Complainant’s part-time work schedule was a reasonable accommodation, the hearing officer reasoned that that the Respondent did have a further obligation to the Complainant. The prognosis for the Complainant’s recovery was unclear, and so termination was premature. The evidence ultimately did not support a finding that the Complainant could have worked full time, however, so she was not entitled to lost wages beyond what she had already been compensated by worker’s compensation and a third-party lawsuit recovery relating to her injury.

Overview: In Savage v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant and awarded substantial back pay and emotional distress damages for employment discrimination based on a disability. The Complainant had a history of dyslexia, attention deficit disorder, and chronic depression prior to being hired by the Respondent, a state agency. These disabilities were made apparent to the Respondent through the Complainant’s initial self-identification and several subsequent disclosures to various supervising staff.

The hearing officer found that the agency failed to engage in meaningful communication with the Complainant and failed to fashion meaningful accommodation for his disabilities. The officer further concluded that the Complainant’s training director “seemed more intent on terminating Complainant’s employment as quickly as possible while he was on probation to avoid dealing with the collective bargaining rights that would adhere once he became a non-probationary employee.” The Complainant had also been subjected to a hostile work environment due to demeaning, bully, and intimidating conduct by the training director.

Overview: In Chase-Eason v. Crescent Yacht Club, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainants, awarding back pay to one of them and emotional distress damages to both. Complainant Eason was subjected to unwanted touching and vulgar comments that were sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile work environment. Even though she did engage in bawdy banter, she “did not waiver in her efforts to protest the behavior directed against her.” The fact that some harassment occurred when Complainant Eason was off duty did not negate the employee/supervisor relationship.

The hearing officer similarly concluded that Complainant Chase was subjected to unwanted touching and hostile language sufficiently severe to constitute harassment. Both Complainants were entitled to emotional distress damages. Complainant Eason, who was terminated, was also entitled to back pay; Complainant Chase, who quit voluntarily, was not.

Overview: In Radwin v. Mass General Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint from a nurse researcher alleging that she was discharged from her position in retaliation for raising the issue that certain events and meetings were scheduled on or around Jewish holidays. The Complainant suggested that she was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment because of her religion.

In deciding to dismiss the complaint, the hearing officer determined that the Complainant failed to establish a causal connection between the protected activity—calling attention to events being scheduled on Jewish holidays—and her termination. Credible evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating the Complainant, namely, that she was “tense, high strung and impatient with those she did not perceive as her intellectual equals” and “repeatedly engaged in conduct that reflected a lack of sensitivity toward support staff.” There was no evidence that scheduling events on or near Jewish holidays was anything but an oversight or at worst insensitivity on the part of the schedulers.

Overview: In Wilson v. MA Dept. of Transitional Assistance, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint alleging that employees at a state agency had engaged in discrimination on the basis of race/color and retaliation. The Complainant’s testimony relied largely on claims that several employees repeatedly referred to her as “the black girl” or “the new black girl” and that a supervisor excessively sent back her work for corrections.

The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to a racially hostile workplace or disparate treatment based on racial animus. The Complainant’s testimony was consistently deemed not credible, leading to the conclusion that “she fabricated a self-serving fictional account of racial intolerance and hostility.” Furthermore, there was no credible evidence of a causal connection between the alleged discrimination and the retaliatory behavior. The hearing officer further noted that the Respondent took prompt investigative action by opening a thorough investigation within a few weeks of the initial complaints.

Overview: In Mayer v. Boston Children’s Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the hospital of terminating a sixty-four-year-old nurse due to age-based discrimination. The hearing officer found no direct evidence of discriminatory animus in stray remarks apparently made to the Complainant, such as compliments for having youthful looks and energy for a person of her age.

Although the Complainant satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for discrimination based on age, the Respondent met its burden of production by showing legitimate reasons that the Complainant’s dismissal was not discriminatory. The hearing officer credited evidence of three separate lapses in clinical performance over a five-month span, followed by a violation in hospital policy when the Complainant told a woman seeking medical care to find an adult hospital instead. The Respondent had previously terminated a twenty-seven-year-old nurse for threatening a coworker and shouting obscenities without any prior discipline, a noteworthy contrast to the Complainant’s lengthy disciplinary record.

Overview: In Bako v. Omega Foods, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the Dunkin’ Donuts operator of discrimination based on disability after the employee was not immediately returned to her prior shift following a nine-month medical leave of absence for breast cancer treatment. The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability but determined that the Respondent met its burden of production by articulating “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not immediately rehiring” the Complainant. The Complainant did not provide evidence to show that the reasons she was not rehired were a pretext for discrimination.

Many disputed facts were resolved in favor of the Respondent, whose testimony was deemed credible and consistent with documentary evidence. In particular, the hearing officer credited the Respondent’s assertions that the Complainant rejected outright an offer of possible placement at a different location and that it was impossible to modify the work schedules of all 50 employees within the time period demanded by the Complainant to get her back to work in her original shift. Conversely, the hearing officer found the Complainant’s testimony to be “evasive and disingenuous is so many respects as to cast doubt on her credibility in general.”

Overview: In Picco v. Town of Reading, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant and awarded emotional distress damages. This is the MCAD’s second decision in 2016. Although this case began based on causes of action for sexual orientation and perceived sexual orientation, the hearing officer noted that the evidence presented at public hearing did not show that the Complainant is gay or was perceived as such. The MCAD noted that “[s]uch a discrepancy is not fatal, however, because the crux of the charge is that Complainant was subjected to homophobic names and a sexual assault by Lt. Stamatis.” In doing so, the hearing officer concluded that the Complainant stated a claim for sexual harassment based on the homophobic slurs directed at him.

Decision Date: February 26, 2016

Overview: In Cooper v. Raytheon, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant and awarded emotional distress damages. This is the MCAD’s third decision in 2016. In finding that Raytheon engaged in handicap discrimination, the hearing officer noted that the Complainant’s managers knew that he suffered from a brain injury and that “when it came time to downgrade certain employees to comply with the bell curve requirement, he was an easy target, because of his cognitive impairments.” In doing so, the MCAD pointed to: (1) evidence that Complainant’s supervisor altered his performance review and made it less favorable than the original language provided by his peers; and (2) the scant evidence that “Complainant’s performance problems were disproportionate to others, who were not disabled.”

In weighing credibility, the hearing officer did not credit the testimony of a company witness who contended that she placed Complainant on a performance improvement plan to help him succeed; rather, the hearing officer pointed to evidence suggesting that the “real intent of the PIP was to force Complainant from his position.” Finally, the MCAD noted that an extension or cancellation of the PIP, and alternatively quarterly goals as the Complainant’s sister had requested, “would likely have been an effective reasonable accommodation” in light of the nature of Complainant’s disability.

Before proceeding to trial, an employment discrimination case in court must survive a hurdle in the procedural process known as summary judgment, which is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56 and Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure (MRCP) 56. As discussed here, the process is different when an employment discrimination case remains under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Under federal law, three Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1986, referred to as The Trilogy, examined the summary judgment standard. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court characterized the summary judgment inquiry as “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” In doing so, the Supreme Court delineated the province of the jury: