Articles Posted in Workplace Retaliation

Overview: In Pavoni v. Wheely Funn Inc., the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation against a roller skating rink owner. The Complainant did establish a prima facie case based on the temporal proximity between her rejection of the business owner’s advances and her termination, which were less than four apart. The Respondent’s staff provided credible testimony, however, that the Complainant had chronic problems with tardiness, frequent breaks, and inattentiveness.

The hearing officer further found that the owner did not “behave like a scorned suitor” after finding out that the Complainant did not reciprocate his feelings, but instead “assured her that her rejection of a personal relationship would not affect her job, turned his attention to dating other women, and promptly met his current wife.” Failure to meet job expectations was what ultimately led to the Complainant’s termination.

Overview: In Gutierrez-Dupuis v. Gabriel Care, LLC, the MCAD found in favor of Complainant Dupuis on her retaliation claim, but it found against Complainant Gutierrez on her claims of retaliation and discrimination based on national origin and race. There was no credible evidence to support claims that Gutierrez was told not to speak Spanish to clients or that her supervisor mocked Gutierrez’s accent. The record also made it clear that Gutierrez was terminated for taking steps to open a competing business and not for complaining about discrimination.

As for Complainant Dupuis, however, the hearing officer arrived at the “inescapable conclusion” that the primary reason she was terminated was because she said she would serve as a supporting witness if Gutierrez filed a discrimination claim. The hearing officer reasoned that Dupuis was “fired for standing up in support of her good faith, if misguided, belief that fellow employee Gutierrez was the victim of discrimination.” She was awarded back pay and emotional distress damages.

Overview: In Pimental v. Bristol County Sheriff’s Office, the MCAD dismissed a complaint alleging that the Bristol County Sherriff’s Office removed the Complainant from his position as affirmative action officer in retaliation for filing prior claims of discrimination. The Complainant had been disciplined for several violations, and he subsequently filed complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and disability. The MCAD dismissed those complaints for lack of probably cause prior to hearing the retaliation claim.

The hearing officer dismissed this complaint after finding no causal connection between the prior allegations and the removal of the Complainant from his role as affirmative action officer. Credible evidence showed that the Complainant did not file an internal complaint with the Sheriff’s Office until after the decision was made to terminate his assignment as affirmative action officer. The hearing officer further noted that there was “no significant penalty inflicted” on the Complainant that would rise to the level of adverse action because his role as affirmative action officer came with no additional pay or relief from his regular duties.

Overview: In Loewy v. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, the MCAD dismissed the complaint alleging racial discrimination and retaliation against the Respondent, a drug development company based in Cambridge. The Complainant alleged that he was unlawfully terminated for refusing to lower the performance rating of a black employee under his supervision which, in turn, would have made it easier for the Respondent to terminate that employee without the appearance of racial discrimination.

The hearing officer determined that the preponderance of credible evidence established no causal connection between the Complainant resisting the instruction to give a lower performance rating and his subsequent termination, thereby undermining the prima facie case for retaliation. The Respondent provided credible testimony that the Complainant was terminated due to concerns about his performance and a change in the company’s personnel needs.

Race discrimination in the workplace is unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Race discrimination claims, like other employment law claims, are subject to strict statute of limitations filing deadlines. Subject to certain very limited exceptions, the failure to file within the applicable deadline will forever bar a victim of employment discrimination from recovering damages – which can include financial loss, emotional distress, and punitives.

In Green v. Brennan, the United States Supreme Court decided when the filing period for a constructive discharge begins to run. There, the plaintiff, Marvin Green, worked for the Postal Service for 35 years. In 2008, he applied for a promotion and was passed over. Green alleged that he was denied the promotion because of his race and that he suffered retaliation thereafter. In 2011, two of Green’s supervisors accused him of delaying the mail; a criminal offense which prompted an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). During the investigation, the supervisors provided Green with a letter re-assigning him to off-duty status. Although the OIG ultimately concluded that no further investigation was required, the supervisors maintained to Green that “the OIG is all over this” and that the criminal charge “could be a life changer.”

Retaliation against employees who exercise their right to medical leave is prohibited under Massachusetts and federal law.  As with any employment discrimination suit,  plaintiffs who bring retaliation claims must overcome various hurdles before having a jury hear and decide their case.  Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal corollary, for instance, an employer may file a motion near the start of the litigation asking the court to dismiss the case due to the alleged lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts to support a particular theory. As an example, a plaintiff who brings suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act against a company that has less than 50 employees would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the law only generally applies to employers with at least 50 employees.

In addition, under Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal corollary, an employer will likely file a motion after the close of discovery once again asking the court to dismiss the case. Through this mechanism, the employer must show that – even when viewing all the evidence in the most favorable light to the employee – there’s no chance a reasonable jury could rule in his or her favor.