Articles Posted in National Origin Discrimination

Overview: In Babu v. Aspen Dental Management, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant, awarding back pay and emotional distress damages for claims of employment discrimination and retaliation. The Complainant, a Romanian immigrant and trained dental assistant, alleged that she was subjected to harassment because of her accent and was retaliated against for objecting to the officer manager’s sexualized behavior towards male patients. The Complainant had consistently received very positive employment reviews in her eight years at Aspen Dental practices prior to the incident in question but was ultimately terminated fourteen months after filing her MCAD complaint.

The hearing officer credited the Complainant’s testimony that she confronted her supervisor about flirting with a patient in the office over the supervisor’s denial. Under a disparate treatment analysis, the hearing officer found direct and indirect evidence of national origin discrimination. The justifications put forth by the Respondent for the discipline against the Complainant and for her eventual termination were found to be illegitimate after close scrutinization. There was a causal connection between the protected activity of complaining about the supervisor’s demeanor and the subsequent adverse employment actions, which had included a demotion in pay and title.

Overview: In Rodriguez v. UPS, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint alleging discrimination based on race and national origin as well as retaliation. The Complainant, a driver and dock worker, claimed that he was subjected to harassing behavior by coworkers, including name-calling and criticism. Although the claims would have been enough to establish a prima facie case if proven, the hearing officer determined that the Complainant was not a credible witness and therefore did not establish a claim.

The hearing officer noted that the Complainant had charged a coworker at a prior company with similar discrimination and lied under oath when he said that he did not file a similar lawsuit against that employer. Furthermore, witnesses contradicted much of the Complainant’s factual testimony. The Complainant’s “unconvincing demeanor,” his “evasions about past matters,” and “the plethora of credible witnesses testifying against him” sufficiently undermined his claims.

Overview: In Gutierrez-Dupuis v. Gabriel Care, LLC, the MCAD found in favor of Complainant Dupuis on her retaliation claim, but it found against Complainant Gutierrez on her claims of retaliation and discrimination based on national origin and race. There was no credible evidence to support claims that Gutierrez was told not to speak Spanish to clients or that her supervisor mocked Gutierrez’s accent. The record also made it clear that Gutierrez was terminated for taking steps to open a competing business and not for complaining about discrimination.

As for Complainant Dupuis, however, the hearing officer arrived at the “inescapable conclusion” that the primary reason she was terminated was because she said she would serve as a supporting witness if Gutierrez filed a discrimination claim. The hearing officer reasoned that Dupuis was “fired for standing up in support of her good faith, if misguided, belief that fellow employee Gutierrez was the victim of discrimination.” She was awarded back pay and emotional distress damages.

Overview: In Verne v. Pelican Products, the MCAD found for the Respondent manufacturer and dismissed a complaint alleging discrimination based on national origin. The Complainant alleged that she was treated differently from non-Puerto Rican employees when she received a “final” warning for sending person emails at work and that she was subjected to hostile racial comments. Her separate complaint for retaliation had previously been dismissed by the MCAD because it was untimely.

Credible evidence established that, as soon as the Respondent’s HR Director became aware that another employee used an offensive epithet, she conducted an immediate investigation and terminated the offender the same day. The Respondent similarly took remedial action in the form of written discipline after another employee uttered a taunt about the Complainant. The hearing officer concluded that there were “some minor, albeit unpleasant, interactions in the workplace which the employer took aggressive steps to monitor and control,” but it was not a hostile work environment. The Complainant similarly could not establish a case for disparate treatment because her conduct in sending inappropriate emails was far worse than that of other employees who had received less discipline.

Overview: In Ke v. New England Baptist Hospital, the MCAD dismissed a complaint accusing the Respondent orthopedic hospital of unlawful termination on the basis of age, disability, race, and national origin. The Complainant was a trained cardiologist of Chinese national origin who worked as an echocardiographer after coming to the United States in 1983. She injured her back while at work in April 2010 and was terminated following an incident in May 2010 that prompted a patient complaint regarding quality of care.

The hearing officer concluded that the Respondent “articulated a reasonable belief, based on a thorough investigation, that Complainant had engaged in serious breaches of policy for which she accepted no responsibility,” which justified termination. There was insufficient credible evidence to conclude that the Respondent was motivated by discriminatory intent. Even if the termination was harsh or unfair, it was clear that the decision to terminate arose from misconduct and subsequent failure to accept responsibility rather than discriminatory animus.

Employment discrimination claims under Massachusetts law, pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act, have a better chance of making it to trial thanks to the clarification issued in Bulwer v. Mt Auburn. There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court evaluated the summary judgment standard under Rule 56 and reiterated, as it first made clear in Blare v. Husky, that Massachusetts is a pretext-only jurisdiction when it comes to proving employment discrimination.  In particular, the SJC reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case at summary judgment, thus allowing the employee’s claims for race and national origin discrimination to proceed to trial and be heard by a jury.

In doing so, the SJC refused to adopt the employer’s articulation of the plaintiff’s burden at summary judgment standard; namely, that an employee must present evidence that the employer’s reason for termination constituted a pretext for discrimination. Rather, consistent with long-standing precedent, the Court reminded litigants that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim “need only present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that ‘the respondent’s facially proper reasons given for its action against him were not the real reasons for that action'” to survive summary judgment and advance to trial.