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Overview: In Radwin v. Mass General Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint from a nurse researcher alleging that she was discharged from her position in retaliation for raising the issue that certain events and meetings were scheduled on or around Jewish holidays. The Complainant suggested that she was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment because of her religion.

In deciding to dismiss the complaint, the hearing officer determined that the Complainant failed to establish a causal connection between the protected activity—calling attention to events being scheduled on Jewish holidays—and her termination. Credible evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating the Complainant, namely, that she was “tense, high strung and impatient with those she did not perceive as her intellectual equals” and “repeatedly engaged in conduct that reflected a lack of sensitivity toward support staff.” There was no evidence that scheduling events on or near Jewish holidays was anything but an oversight or at worst insensitivity on the part of the schedulers.

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Retaliation against employees who exercise their right to medical leave is prohibited under Massachusetts and federal law.  As with any employment discrimination suit,  plaintiffs who bring retaliation claims must overcome various hurdles before having a jury hear and decide their case.  Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal corollary, for instance, an employer may file a motion near the start of the litigation asking the court to dismiss the case due to the alleged lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts to support a particular theory. As an example, a plaintiff who brings suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act against a company that has less than 50 employees would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the law only generally applies to employers with at least 50 employees.

In addition, under Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal corollary, an employer will likely file a motion after the close of discovery once again asking the court to dismiss the case. Through this mechanism, the employer must show that – even when viewing all the evidence in the most favorable light to the employee – there’s no chance a reasonable jury could rule in his or her favor.

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Overview: In Wilson v. MA Dept. of Transitional Assistance, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint alleging that employees at a state agency had engaged in discrimination on the basis of race/color and retaliation. The Complainant’s testimony relied largely on claims that several employees repeatedly referred to her as “the black girl” or “the new black girl” and that a supervisor excessively sent back her work for corrections.

The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to a racially hostile workplace or disparate treatment based on racial animus. The Complainant’s testimony was consistently deemed not credible, leading to the conclusion that “she fabricated a self-serving fictional account of racial intolerance and hostility.” Furthermore, there was no credible evidence of a causal connection between the alleged discrimination and the retaliatory behavior. The hearing officer further noted that the Respondent took prompt investigative action by opening a thorough investigation within a few weeks of the initial complaints.

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Advancing an employment discrimination case to trial often involves a hurdle known as summary judgment, which is governed by Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure and it’s federal corollary. Employers often rely on Rule 56, typically after the close of discovery, as a final attempt to dismiss an employment discrimination case and avoid the risk of trial. This is a watershed moment in the litigation.

As the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, in considering an employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the employee’s evidence of discrimination “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, the Supreme Court also cautioned that a judge “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” because these are jury functions. Rather, as articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Flesner v. Technical Communications, a “judge’s mere belief that the movant is more likely to prevail at trial is not a sufficient basis for granting summary judgment” in the employer’s favor and dismissing the case.

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Overview: In Mayer v. Boston Children’s Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the hospital of terminating a sixty-four-year-old nurse due to age-based discrimination. The hearing officer found no direct evidence of discriminatory animus in stray remarks apparently made to the Complainant, such as compliments for having youthful looks and energy for a person of her age.

Although the Complainant satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for discrimination based on age, the Respondent met its burden of production by showing legitimate reasons that the Complainant’s dismissal was not discriminatory. The hearing officer credited evidence of three separate lapses in clinical performance over a five-month span, followed by a violation in hospital policy when the Complainant told a woman seeking medical care to find an adult hospital instead. The Respondent had previously terminated a twenty-seven-year-old nurse for threatening a coworker and shouting obscenities without any prior discipline, a noteworthy contrast to the Complainant’s lengthy disciplinary record.

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Employment discrimination claims under Massachusetts law, pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act, have a better chance of making it to trial thanks to the clarification issued in Bulwer v. Mt Auburn. There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court evaluated the summary judgment standard under Rule 56 and reiterated, as it first made clear in Blare v. Husky, that Massachusetts is a pretext-only jurisdiction when it comes to proving employment discrimination.  In particular, the SJC reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case at summary judgment, thus allowing the employee’s claims for race and national origin discrimination to proceed to trial and be heard by a jury.

In doing so, the SJC refused to adopt the employer’s articulation of the plaintiff’s burden at summary judgment standard; namely, that an employee must present evidence that the employer’s reason for termination constituted a pretext for discrimination. Rather, consistent with long-standing precedent, the Court reminded litigants that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim “need only present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that ‘the respondent’s facially proper reasons given for its action against him were not the real reasons for that action'” to survive summary judgment and advance to trial.

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Overview: In Bako v. Omega Foods, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the Dunkin’ Donuts operator of discrimination based on disability after the employee was not immediately returned to her prior shift following a nine-month medical leave of absence for breast cancer treatment. The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability but determined that the Respondent met its burden of production by articulating “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not immediately rehiring” the Complainant. The Complainant did not provide evidence to show that the reasons she was not rehired were a pretext for discrimination.

Many disputed facts were resolved in favor of the Respondent, whose testimony was deemed credible and consistent with documentary evidence. In particular, the hearing officer credited the Respondent’s assertions that the Complainant rejected outright an offer of possible placement at a different location and that it was impossible to modify the work schedules of all 50 employees within the time period demanded by the Complainant to get her back to work in her original shift. Conversely, the hearing officer found the Complainant’s testimony to be “evasive and disingenuous is so many respects as to cast doubt on her credibility in general.”

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Whether it’s a disability discrimination or sexual harassment claim, employment discrimination cases in general tend to be very fact-intensive, making the discovery process and depositions in particular all the more critical. As the moving party, it is the employee’s ultimate burden to prove discriminatory bias which, as discussed here, can be inferred in several ways. Generally, the greater the opportunity to gather information through the discovery process, the better an employee’s chance of prevailing at trial.

The opportunity to gather sufficient evidence, however, can be severely hindered where an employer engages in obstructionist tactics. Namely, in depositions, such tactics take the form of speaking objections, witness coaching, and improperly instructing a deponent not to answer a particular question. In addition, even after a deposition, a deponent may attempt to distance his or herself from unfavorable testimony by making substantive changes to an errata sheet.

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Overview: In Picco v. Town of Reading, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant and awarded emotional distress damages. This is the MCAD’s second decision in 2016. Although this case began based on causes of action for sexual orientation and perceived sexual orientation, the hearing officer noted that the evidence presented at public hearing did not show that the Complainant is gay or was perceived as such. The MCAD noted that “[s]uch a discrepancy is not fatal, however, because the crux of the charge is that Complainant was subjected to homophobic names and a sexual assault by Lt. Stamatis.” In doing so, the hearing officer concluded that the Complainant stated a claim for sexual harassment based on the homophobic slurs directed at him.

Decision Date: February 26, 2016

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Overview: In Cooper v. Raytheon, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainant and awarded emotional distress damages. This is the MCAD’s third decision in 2016. In finding that Raytheon engaged in handicap discrimination, the hearing officer noted that the Complainant’s managers knew that he suffered from a brain injury and that “when it came time to downgrade certain employees to comply with the bell curve requirement, he was an easy target, because of his cognitive impairments.” In doing so, the MCAD pointed to: (1) evidence that Complainant’s supervisor altered his performance review and made it less favorable than the original language provided by his peers; and (2) the scant evidence that “Complainant’s performance problems were disproportionate to others, who were not disabled.”

In weighing credibility, the hearing officer did not credit the testimony of a company witness who contended that she placed Complainant on a performance improvement plan to help him succeed; rather, the hearing officer pointed to evidence suggesting that the “real intent of the PIP was to force Complainant from his position.” Finally, the MCAD noted that an extension or cancellation of the PIP, and alternatively quarterly goals as the Complainant’s sister had requested, “would likely have been an effective reasonable accommodation” in light of the nature of Complainant’s disability.

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