Articles Posted in Hearing Officer Betty E. Waxman

Overview: In Verne v. Pelican Products, the MCAD found for the Respondent manufacturer and dismissed a complaint alleging discrimination based on national origin. The Complainant alleged that she was treated differently from non-Puerto Rican employees when she received a “final” warning for sending person emails at work and that she was subjected to hostile racial comments. Her separate complaint for retaliation had previously been dismissed by the MCAD because it was untimely.

Credible evidence established that, as soon as the Respondent’s HR Director became aware that another employee used an offensive epithet, she conducted an immediate investigation and terminated the offender the same day. The Respondent similarly took remedial action in the form of written discipline after another employee uttered a taunt about the Complainant. The hearing officer concluded that there were “some minor, albeit unpleasant, interactions in the workplace which the employer took aggressive steps to monitor and control,” but it was not a hostile work environment. The Complainant similarly could not establish a case for disparate treatment because her conduct in sending inappropriate emails was far worse than that of other employees who had received less discipline.

Overview: In Pimental v. Bristol County Sheriff’s Office, the MCAD dismissed a complaint alleging that the Bristol County Sherriff’s Office removed the Complainant from his position as affirmative action officer in retaliation for filing prior claims of discrimination. The Complainant had been disciplined for several violations, and he subsequently filed complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and disability. The MCAD dismissed those complaints for lack of probably cause prior to hearing the retaliation claim.

The hearing officer dismissed this complaint after finding no causal connection between the prior allegations and the removal of the Complainant from his role as affirmative action officer. Credible evidence showed that the Complainant did not file an internal complaint with the Sheriff’s Office until after the decision was made to terminate his assignment as affirmative action officer. The hearing officer further noted that there was “no significant penalty inflicted” on the Complainant that would rise to the level of adverse action because his role as affirmative action officer came with no additional pay or relief from his regular duties.

Overview: In Loewy v. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, the MCAD dismissed the complaint alleging racial discrimination and retaliation against the Respondent, a drug development company based in Cambridge. The Complainant alleged that he was unlawfully terminated for refusing to lower the performance rating of a black employee under his supervision which, in turn, would have made it easier for the Respondent to terminate that employee without the appearance of racial discrimination.

The hearing officer determined that the preponderance of credible evidence established no causal connection between the Complainant resisting the instruction to give a lower performance rating and his subsequent termination, thereby undermining the prima facie case for retaliation. The Respondent provided credible testimony that the Complainant was terminated due to concerns about his performance and a change in the company’s personnel needs.

Overview: In Chase-Eason v. Crescent Yacht Club, the MCAD found in favor of the Complainants, awarding back pay to one of them and emotional distress damages to both. Complainant Eason was subjected to unwanted touching and vulgar comments that were sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile work environment. Even though she did engage in bawdy banter, she “did not waiver in her efforts to protest the behavior directed against her.” The fact that some harassment occurred when Complainant Eason was off duty did not negate the employee/supervisor relationship.

The hearing officer similarly concluded that Complainant Chase was subjected to unwanted touching and hostile language sufficiently severe to constitute harassment. Both Complainants were entitled to emotional distress damages. Complainant Eason, who was terminated, was also entitled to back pay; Complainant Chase, who quit voluntarily, was not.

Overview: In Mayer v. Boston Children’s Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the hospital of terminating a sixty-four-year-old nurse due to age-based discrimination. The hearing officer found no direct evidence of discriminatory animus in stray remarks apparently made to the Complainant, such as compliments for having youthful looks and energy for a person of her age.

Although the Complainant satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for discrimination based on age, the Respondent met its burden of production by showing legitimate reasons that the Complainant’s dismissal was not discriminatory. The hearing officer credited evidence of three separate lapses in clinical performance over a five-month span, followed by a violation in hospital policy when the Complainant told a woman seeking medical care to find an adult hospital instead. The Respondent had previously terminated a twenty-seven-year-old nurse for threatening a coworker and shouting obscenities without any prior discipline, a noteworthy contrast to the Complainant’s lengthy disciplinary record.