Articles Posted in Respondent

Overview: In Verne v. Pelican Products, the MCAD found for the Respondent manufacturer and dismissed a complaint alleging discrimination based on national origin. The Complainant alleged that she was treated differently from non-Puerto Rican employees when she received a “final” warning for sending person emails at work and that she was subjected to hostile racial comments. Her separate complaint for retaliation had previously been dismissed by the MCAD because it was untimely.

Credible evidence established that, as soon as the Respondent’s HR Director became aware that another employee used an offensive epithet, she conducted an immediate investigation and terminated the offender the same day. The Respondent similarly took remedial action in the form of written discipline after another employee uttered a taunt about the Complainant. The hearing officer concluded that there were “some minor, albeit unpleasant, interactions in the workplace which the employer took aggressive steps to monitor and control,” but it was not a hostile work environment. The Complainant similarly could not establish a case for disparate treatment because her conduct in sending inappropriate emails was far worse than that of other employees who had received less discipline.

Overview: In Pimental v. Bristol County Sheriff’s Office, the MCAD dismissed a complaint alleging that the Bristol County Sherriff’s Office removed the Complainant from his position as affirmative action officer in retaliation for filing prior claims of discrimination. The Complainant had been disciplined for several violations, and he subsequently filed complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and disability. The MCAD dismissed those complaints for lack of probably cause prior to hearing the retaliation claim.

The hearing officer dismissed this complaint after finding no causal connection between the prior allegations and the removal of the Complainant from his role as affirmative action officer. Credible evidence showed that the Complainant did not file an internal complaint with the Sheriff’s Office until after the decision was made to terminate his assignment as affirmative action officer. The hearing officer further noted that there was “no significant penalty inflicted” on the Complainant that would rise to the level of adverse action because his role as affirmative action officer came with no additional pay or relief from his regular duties.

Overview: In Ke v. New England Baptist Hospital, the MCAD dismissed a complaint accusing the Respondent orthopedic hospital of unlawful termination on the basis of age, disability, race, and national origin. The Complainant was a trained cardiologist of Chinese national origin who worked as an echocardiographer after coming to the United States in 1983. She injured her back while at work in April 2010 and was terminated following an incident in May 2010 that prompted a patient complaint regarding quality of care.

The hearing officer concluded that the Respondent “articulated a reasonable belief, based on a thorough investigation, that Complainant had engaged in serious breaches of policy for which she accepted no responsibility,” which justified termination. There was insufficient credible evidence to conclude that the Respondent was motivated by discriminatory intent. Even if the termination was harsh or unfair, it was clear that the decision to terminate arose from misconduct and subsequent failure to accept responsibility rather than discriminatory animus.

Overview: In Loewy v. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, the MCAD dismissed the complaint alleging racial discrimination and retaliation against the Respondent, a drug development company based in Cambridge. The Complainant alleged that he was unlawfully terminated for refusing to lower the performance rating of a black employee under his supervision which, in turn, would have made it easier for the Respondent to terminate that employee without the appearance of racial discrimination.

The hearing officer determined that the preponderance of credible evidence established no causal connection between the Complainant resisting the instruction to give a lower performance rating and his subsequent termination, thereby undermining the prima facie case for retaliation. The Respondent provided credible testimony that the Complainant was terminated due to concerns about his performance and a change in the company’s personnel needs.

Overview: In Radwin v. Mass General Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint from a nurse researcher alleging that she was discharged from her position in retaliation for raising the issue that certain events and meetings were scheduled on or around Jewish holidays. The Complainant suggested that she was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment because of her religion.

In deciding to dismiss the complaint, the hearing officer determined that the Complainant failed to establish a causal connection between the protected activity—calling attention to events being scheduled on Jewish holidays—and her termination. Credible evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating the Complainant, namely, that she was “tense, high strung and impatient with those she did not perceive as her intellectual equals” and “repeatedly engaged in conduct that reflected a lack of sensitivity toward support staff.” There was no evidence that scheduling events on or near Jewish holidays was anything but an oversight or at worst insensitivity on the part of the schedulers.

Overview: In Wilson v. MA Dept. of Transitional Assistance, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint alleging that employees at a state agency had engaged in discrimination on the basis of race/color and retaliation. The Complainant’s testimony relied largely on claims that several employees repeatedly referred to her as “the black girl” or “the new black girl” and that a supervisor excessively sent back her work for corrections.

The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to a racially hostile workplace or disparate treatment based on racial animus. The Complainant’s testimony was consistently deemed not credible, leading to the conclusion that “she fabricated a self-serving fictional account of racial intolerance and hostility.” Furthermore, there was no credible evidence of a causal connection between the alleged discrimination and the retaliatory behavior. The hearing officer further noted that the Respondent took prompt investigative action by opening a thorough investigation within a few weeks of the initial complaints.

Overview: In Mayer v. Boston Children’s Hospital, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the hospital of terminating a sixty-four-year-old nurse due to age-based discrimination. The hearing officer found no direct evidence of discriminatory animus in stray remarks apparently made to the Complainant, such as compliments for having youthful looks and energy for a person of her age.

Although the Complainant satisfied the elements of a prima facie case for discrimination based on age, the Respondent met its burden of production by showing legitimate reasons that the Complainant’s dismissal was not discriminatory. The hearing officer credited evidence of three separate lapses in clinical performance over a five-month span, followed by a violation in hospital policy when the Complainant told a woman seeking medical care to find an adult hospital instead. The Respondent had previously terminated a twenty-seven-year-old nurse for threatening a coworker and shouting obscenities without any prior discipline, a noteworthy contrast to the Complainant’s lengthy disciplinary record.

Overview: In Bako v. Omega Foods, the MCAD found in favor of the Respondent and dismissed the complaint accusing the Dunkin’ Donuts operator of discrimination based on disability after the employee was not immediately returned to her prior shift following a nine-month medical leave of absence for breast cancer treatment. The hearing officer concluded that the Complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability but determined that the Respondent met its burden of production by articulating “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not immediately rehiring” the Complainant. The Complainant did not provide evidence to show that the reasons she was not rehired were a pretext for discrimination.

Many disputed facts were resolved in favor of the Respondent, whose testimony was deemed credible and consistent with documentary evidence. In particular, the hearing officer credited the Respondent’s assertions that the Complainant rejected outright an offer of possible placement at a different location and that it was impossible to modify the work schedules of all 50 employees within the time period demanded by the Complainant to get her back to work in her original shift. Conversely, the hearing officer found the Complainant’s testimony to be “evasive and disingenuous is so many respects as to cast doubt on her credibility in general.”

Before proceeding to trial, an employment discrimination case in court must survive a hurdle in the procedural process known as summary judgment, which is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56 and Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure (MRCP) 56. As discussed here, the process is different when an employment discrimination case remains under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Under federal law, three Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1986, referred to as The Trilogy, examined the summary judgment standard. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court characterized the summary judgment inquiry as “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” In doing so, the Supreme Court delineated the province of the jury: